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Abstract. Spiritual formation currently lacks a robust epistemology. Christian theol-
ogy and philosophy often spend more time devoted to an epistemology of proposi-
tions rather than an epistemology of knowing persons. This paper is an attempt to
move toward a more robust account of knowing persons in general and God in par-
ticular. After working through various aspects of the nature of this type of knowledge
this theory is applied to specific issues germane to spiritual formation, such as the
justification of understanding spiritual growth on an integrative and holistic (heart
and mind) model, the reality of hearing God’s voice, and knowing his activity, as 
well as how such a theory should change the shape of sermons, evangelism, and
 apologetics. 
Thus says the LORD, “Let not a wise man boast of his wisdom,
and let not the mighty man boast of his might, let not a rich man
boast of his riches; 24 but let him who boasts boast of this, that he
understands and knows Me, that I am the LORD who exercises
lovingkindness, justice and righteousness on earth; for I delight in
these things,” declares the LORD (Jer. 9:23–24).1
Introduction
Knowledge, like wisdom, faith, hope, and love, is essential for a flour-
ishing life.2 In a general sense, knowledge reconciles and ties us to reality.
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2 I am very grateful to J. P. Moreland and Dallas Willard for many helpful dis-
cussions on the ideas in this paper and their encouragement to pursue the wider proj-
ect this paper is a part of. I am also very grateful to Paul Moser and Michael David
Hatcher for helpful comments on the first draft.
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The same is true of the spiritual life. Without knowledge of God we perish
(Hosea 4:6; Rom. 1:18–25) because full-blooded eternal life actually is
knowledge of God (John 17:3). Theology and philosophy, however, largely
attend to knowledge about facts, while knowledge of persons—knowing
God, self, and others—has received far less consideration. Regrettably,
knowledge of God is often reduced to something far less than knowledge, a
kind of non-cognitive private experience. In this essay, I demonstrate the
distinction between knowledge about things and people and knowledge of
things and people. With special attention to knowledge of people, I draw
into focus a variety of features this type of knowledge has and make special
applications to knowing God and the life of discipleship. This project can
be understood as developing an epistemology of knowing God in general
and spiritual formation more specifically. 
1. Kinds of Knowledge
Knowledge, as Henry Holland puts it, brings us into communion with
reality.3 It is, after all, the most reliable means of interacting with reality.4
More detailed accounts of knowledge will be given below. For now, I am
content with considering what knowledge affords. According to Dallas
Willard, more often than not:
(K) If person S has knowledge regarding x, then S has the ability to rep-
resent x as it is on an appropriate basis of thought and experience.5
Whatever it is in the details knowledge brings individuals into communion
with reality in a way that is reliable, intentional, and communicable. The
same cannot be said about mere belief. 
Jesus, of course, understood this. He was far less interested in getting
people to merely commit, believe, or profess belief.6 Instead, his ministry
was characterized by making available knowledge of God and his kingdom.
But, what exactly is it to have knowledge of God? Is it the kind of knowl-
edge gained through the sciences? Is it some sort of non-cognitive, mystical,
or merely emotional experience? Is it simply a relationship? When we press
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3 Henry Holland, The Philosophy of Faith and the Fourth Gospel, ed. Wilfrid
Richmond (London: John Murray, 1920), 45.
4 This is especially true regarding moral knowledge. See Dallas Willard, “How
Moral Knowledge Disappeared,” in Knowing Christ Today: Why We Can Trust Spir-
itual Knowledge (San Francisco: HarperOne, 2009); and Willard’s forthcoming
book, The Disappearance of Moral Knowledge.
5 Dallas Willard, “Knowledge and Naturalism,” in Naturalism: A Critical
Analysis, eds. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (New York: Routledge, 2000),
31.
6 Willard, Knowing Christ Today, 15–17.
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into the issue I suspect the answer to these questions is no and that a robust
account of knowing God is much more profound and penetrating. Consider
the following knowledge statements:7
(1) “Laura knows Jesus.” 
(2) “Laura knows how to write about Jesus.” 
(3) “Laura knows who Jesus is.” 
(4) “Laura knows when Jesus lived.” 
(5) “Laura knows that Jesus was raised from the dead.” 
These statements express different uses of the term “know.” But, as we will
discover, these statements express different types of knowledge. 
Statements of the form “S knows that p“ (where S is a person and p is
any statement) are commonly taken to express propositional knowledge
(PK), which is stated as follows:
(PK): S knows that p = df. S has knowledge of some proposition about x
(i.e., for some proposition p, p is about x, and S knows p).8
A key feature of PK is that the object of knowledge is a true proposition or
declarative statement. With this understanding we can evaluate the state-
ments above. Most philosophers agree that every statement above, except
for (1) and (2), are expressions of PK because what is known is a propo-
sition.9
Clearly, (5) is an expression of propositional knowledge, as its object is
the true proposition: “Jesus was raised from the dead.” Likewise, (3) ex-
presses knowing true propositions about Jesus: that Jesus is God, that Jesus
was a carpenter from Nazareth, that Jesus was a brilliant rabbi, that Jesus
died for the sins of the world, among so many other things. Similarly, in (4)
what is being known is a proposition regarding when Jesus lived. 
What then of (1) and (2)? Classically, (2) has been understood as an ex-
pression of know-how, understood as follows:
(KH): S knows how to A = df. S is able to A.
206 Journal of Spiritual Formation & Soul Care
7 This is a modification of the list given in, Richard Feldman, Epistemology (Up-
per Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 8–9.
8 PK may in some cases include a constituent knowledge by acquaintance as
stated below. The semantic value of propositions with de re concepts such as, a color
concept or a pain concept may require KA for the knower. For example, the semantic
value of the term “blue,” if I am going to know that “the door is blue,” requires that
I have KA of blue. Thus, we have the distinction between mere PK and PK with a KA
constituent. For the purposes of this paper, I am primarily concerned with mere PK.
9 This is not recognized only by epistemologists, however. The French language,
for example, has specific words for these two kinds of knowledge: connaître (to
know a person) and savoir (to know a fact).
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When a child learns how to ride a bike, they typically do so with very little
or no propositional knowledge about how to ride a bike. Rather, they are
shown how to ride a bike and given the opportunity to learn the skill
through practice. Clearly they know how to ride a bike, although they lack
the propositional knowledge associated with bike riding. Similarly, I know
how to juggle, but lack the propositional knowledge about the physics of
juggling. Accordingly, (2) expresses a non-propositional type of knowledge. 
There is another kind of knowledge expressed by (1). Consider the follow-
ing case. Sarah is an astute biographer and omniscient with respect to facts
about my daughter, Alyssia. However, Sarah has never met Alyssia. After
publishing her book on Alyssia, Sarah and I meet. It would not strike us as
odd for me to say something like, “Excellent book, Sarah. I learned a lot
about Alyssia, but you really do not know her.” Further, imagine Sarah
meets Alyssia and they spend the day together. Does Sarah come to know
anything during that time? Presumably she does, and what she learns is
something like what Sarah previously lacked. As Richard Feldman points
out,
No matter how many facts you know about a person, it does not fol-
low that you know the person. Knowing a person or a thing is being ac-
quainted with that person or thing, not having propositional knowl-
edge about the person or thing.10
When Sarah encounters Alyssia, she becomes acquainted with her and
thereby comes to know Alyssia in a way not captured by her propositional
knowledge about her. This is the type of knowledge (1) expresses. My wife,
Laura, knows Jesus in a way that is neither propositional, nor know-how.
Laura is acquainted with Jesus, such that she has knowledge of Jesus. This
type of knowledge is broadly characterized as follows:
(KA) S knows x = broadly means: (i) S is directly acquainted with X,
where X is a real world object or agent; and (ii) X provides a promi-
nent evidential role in the non-inferential, immediate justification with
respect to S’s knowledge of X.11
This type of knowledge is commonly referred to as knowledge by acquain-
tance (KA) and has been recognized at least as far back as Plato.12 The de-
tails of (i) and (ii) are attended to in section 2.
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10 Feldman, Epistemology, 11.
11 In certain cases KA can include a conceptual component. In these cases S is
acquainted with x as y. For example, I am acquainted with the cup in front of me as
my cup of coffee. My non-conceptual KA of the cup brings with it my conceptual KA
of the cup as my coffee cup. Hence, we have mere KA and KA with conceptual con-
tent. This paper makes use of both, but focuses on mere KA primarily. 
12 Francisco J. Gonzales, “Nonpropositional Knowledge in Plato,” Aperion
XXXI, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 235–84.
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Notice, I have not offered a definition of knowledge by acquaintance
but rather a basic characterization. I am not convinced one can provide suf-
ficient conditions for knowledge by acquaintance. I understand KA to be
sui generis—of its own kind—and not reducible to know-how or PK.
Rather than offer a definition, we can describe the characteristics involved
in specific cases of KA and perhaps suggest general conditions, some of
which may be necessary, but not exhaustive nor sufficient. This is achieved
by being acquainted with acquaintance, and attending to its phenomeno-
logical, ontological, and logical structure. Doing so affords one knowledge
by acquaintance through the phenomenon of acquaintance itself.13
To summarize, there is a distinct type of knowledge—knowledge by ac-
quaintance—that is not reducible to propositional knowledge or know-
how.14 This type of knowledge captures a significant aspect of what it
means to know a person. In the following section, the much-needed philo-
sophical work is done to explain various essential features of KA. In section
3, I make specific applications of this philosophical work in regards to the
transformative life of abiding in Christ. 
2. Essential Features of Knowledge by Acquaintance
The contemporary conversation concerning types of knowledge typi-
cally makes use of knowledge by acquaintance as a means of distinguishing
propositional knowledge, but much more can, and indeed should, be said
about KA. To be clear, I am not defending the view of any one thinker. In
fact, I have reservations about the details of Russell’s theory, for example.
Rather, I am drawing from a range of phenomena and philosophical work
to reveal a range of characteristics of KA. 
2.1 KA as Encounter
Knowledge by acquaintance demands personal presence—first hand fa-
miliarity. In turn KA necessarily involves an encounter, the direct experi-
ence—in many cases the interaction—with the object or agent being
known. Encounter is a rich event while experiences are often quite thin. En-
counter allows the knower to grasp the object or agent. Willard writes, 
Knowledge “at a distance,” knowing certain “facts” about something,
doesn’t amount to knowing it. It therefore does not have the same
208 Journal of Spiritual Formation & Soul Care
13 Richard Fumerton, Metaphysical and Epistemological Problems of Percep-
tion (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 38.
14 This alone has done much to reveal the prevailing views of knowledge (natu-
ralism and postmodernism) that push Jesus and his church into an ill-perceived irrel-
evance for life as both shallow and fictitious.
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power over life . . . Only the later [knowledge by acquaintance] is the
interactive relationship, the “reality hook,” that gives us a grasp of the
person or the thing “itself.”15
This is exactly what is demonstrated in the previous case. Sarah grasps or
understands Alyssia in a way that her exhaustive knowledge of facts about
Alyssia did not afford her. To really grasp Alyssia, Sarah needed to en-
counter Alyssia, to be acquainted with her. This is perhaps the most funda-
mental feature of KA. To be clear, this is much more than mere experience.
Knowledge by acquaintance involves an encounter of a particular kind 
and quality that involves the following traits which go deeper than mere
 experience. 
2.2 KA, the Given and Direct Awareness
Bertrand Russell, the philosopher responsible for the term “knowledge
by acquaintance,” explains: “I say that I am acquainted with an object
when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object; i.e., when I am di-
rectly aware of that object itself.”16 Elsewhere, he states, “I think the rela-
tion of subject and object which I call acquaintance is simply the converse
of the relation of object and subject which constitutes presentation.”17 At
work in the background here is what is referred to as the givenness and the
given of the object being known. Accordingly, an object of perception or
experience of some agent or object x (the intentional object) is given in per-
ception or experience in virtue of the givenness x has. The givenness of an
object is the property the object has in virtue of which it is given.18 More
specifically,
x is given to a person, S = df. S is immediately aware of x, and x can
play a prominent evidential role in the non-inferential, immediate justi-
fication of a foundational belief.19
For S to be directly acquainted with x just means that S’s acquaintance with
x is neither mediated through nor inferred from anything. That is, S is im-
mediately aware of x just in case S has a mental state M that is directly
Rickabaugh: Eternal Life as Knowledge of God 209
15 Willard, Knowing Christ Today, 141.
16 Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic (1929; repr., New York: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 1988), 209.
17 Russell, Mysticism and Logic, 210.
18 Steven L. Porter, Restoring the Foundations of Epistemic Justification: A Di-
rect Realist and Conceptualist Theory of Foundationalism (New York: Lexington
Books, 2006), 59.
19 Paul K. Moser, Knowledge and Evidence (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1989), 186.
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 intentionally directed at x. My direct awareness of the cup on my desk, for
example, does not require and is not mediated through a concept of a cup
or inferred from a chain of beliefs leading me to believe there is a cup in
front of me. I simply see the cup.
To clarify, being acquainted with a given object does not entail that one
is acquainted with every aspect of the object. That I have KA of an inten-
tional object x does not mean x is wholly present to me or that all of the
constituents of that object are wholly present to me. The most obvious
cases have to do with persons. Just because I am acquainted with my wife
does not entail that I am acquainted with every aspect of her or her charac-
ter. Neither does it follow that because I am not acquainted with every as-
pect of my wife, I am not acquainted with her.20
2.3 KA, Concepts and Language
Because KA is non-inferentially justified and direct, it is not necessarily
conceptual or propositional. In fact, one can have KA of some object or
agent x without possessing the conceptual or linguistic resources to repre-
sent x.21 Although KA can enable a conceptual state it need not do so.22
This has been confirmed in psychological studies of infants who completely
lack language yet have the ability to know and recognize their mother, even
replicating facial expressions as early as one day old.23 There is also fasci-
nating neuroscientific evidence demonstrating this. For example, individu-
als with associative agnosia, which is typically due to damage in the occipi-
totemporal region of either brain hemispheres, can correctly perceive
objects presented visually, evidenced by their ability to successfully perform
basic tasks with those objects. However, individuals with associative ag-
nosia lack the ability to identify or describe the object’s definitive attributes
linguistically.24 While they perceive the object, they do not perceive the ob-
ject through their conception of it. 
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20 Fumerton, Metaphysical and Epistemological Problems of Perception, 59.
21 Richard Fumerton, “Classical Foundationalism,” in Resurrecting Old-Fash-
ioned Foundationalism, ed. Michael R. DePaul (New York: Rowman & Littlefield,
2001), 13.
22 This is most clearly distinguished between cases of being acquainted with P
(which is non-conceptual and non-propositional) and knowing P by acquaintance
(which is in part conceptual and propositional).
23 Eleonore Stump sights the recent collection of papers on these studies in,
Naomi Eilan et al. eds., Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in
Philosophy of Psychology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005).
24 Marie T. Banich and Rebecca J. Compton, Cognitive Neuroscience, 3rd ed.
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2010), 183–85.
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In this way, KA is deeply relational as the relation between the two re-
lata (person and world or person and person) is directly encountered.25
More specifically,
(C) If one is directly acquainted with x, then one is aware of x in such
a way that one does not need propositional or conceptual relations to
x, or any other intermediaries in one’s awareness of x.26
Of course, it does not follow that in instances of KA, concepts or proposi-
tions cannot accompany acts of acquaintance, only that concepts do not act
as a lens through which the act of acquaintance itself occurs.27 That is, the
occurrent mental state M that is of the intentional object x has non-concep-
tual content.28 Concepts do not stand between us and the world, and they
certainly do not create the world.29 Even in cases of seeing an entity as so-
and-so, it does not follow that my seeing the entity must be as so-and-so.
My seeing an entity as so-and-so can be revised in virtue of closer examina-
tion.30 If I have an awareness of a statue of an owl as an owl I am mistaken.
However, I can come close and realize the statue does not fly away and
come to be aware of the statue as a statue. All the while, however, I am al-
ways aware of the statue. 
In the positive sense, concepts aid in habituating attention toward ob-
jects and agents acquaintance. Our concepts, for better or for worse, often
condition that of which we are aware. If I have an accurate conception of a
sunset I know when and where to focus my attention to encounter a sunset.
This is the case because the essence of a concept is that it necessarily por-
trays the nature of the thing the concept is of.31 Hence, if my character is
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25 It is worth pointing out that KA is inherently at odds with varieties of post-
modernism. A central tenant of postmodern thought is the notion that all perception
is theory laden, and, consequently, one’s presuppositions are irrevocably blinded by
culture, race, sex, and necessarily stand between one’s perceptions of reality and real-
ity itself. However, it is becoming clear that knowledge by acquaintance is a legiti-
mate form of knowledge that is direct, unmediated, and non-conceptual.
26 Moser, Knowledge and Evidence, 186.
27 Ibid., 81. 
28 For more on non-conceptual content, see Walter Hopp, “How to Think about
Nonconceptual Content,” The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomeno-
logical Philosophy 10 (2010): 1–24; and “Conceptualism and the Myth of the
Given,” European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2009): 363–85. 
29 See Dallas Willard, “How Concepts Relate the Mind to Its Objects: The
‘God’s Eye View’ Vindicated?” Philosophia Christi 2, vol. 1, no. 2 (1999): 5–20.
30 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Role of Concepts in Our Access to Reality,” in
The Nature of Nature: Examining the Role of Naturalism in Science, eds. Bruce L.
Gordon and William A. Dembski (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2011), 266–67.
31 Dallas Willard, Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge: A Study in Husserl’s
Early Philosophy (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1984), 23–26.
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formed such that I am morally and spiritual sensitive to injustice, I am more
likely to be aware of cases of injustice. In the phenomenology of acts of
knowing, Edmund Husserl demonstrated that one finds that something is as
it has been thought of; that the intentionality—the aboutness quality—of
our thoughts or concepts has been fulfilled.32 That is, in acts of knowing,
we experience the fulfillment of our thought of something as accurately rep-
resenting how we thought of that thing. Accordingly, a thought is possible
of fulfillment when it is possible for the intentional object to be experi-
enced. Likewise, our intentions are fulfilled when the object intended is ac-
tually experienced. The experience of fulfillment, even when only partial,
informs us of the accuracy of our concepts. The more detailed and accurate
our concepts are, in consequence of fulfillment, the more able we are to re-
liably gain knowledge and be acquainted with a variety of important ob-
jects and people. 
2.4 KA and the Causal Acquaintance Principle
J. P. Moreland has recently made a fascinating point regarding KA, of-
fering what he calls the Causal-Acquaintance Principle (CA). CA states that
necessarily, if a subject S has knowledge by acquaintance with a causal fact
x, then S has knowledge by acquaintance with the relevant causal object
y.33 Moreland offers the following example: “If S is directly aware of a
hammer’s causing a nail to move (the causal fact), then s is directly aware of
the hammer.”34 S’s direct awareness of the hammer moving the nail affords
S knowledge that the hammer caused the nail to move. Consequently, the
relevant phenomenological seemings and appearings of the encounter or ex-
perience of the hammer moving the nail justify one’s belief in propositions
such as, “I have the strong appearance of a hammer’s causing a nail to
move.”35 The justificatory role of phenomenological seemings and appear-
ing is central to knowledge by acquaintance, and although Moreland devel-
ops this principle with respect to knowledge of one’s self, there are pro-
found implications for knowledge of God which I explore in section 3.2. 
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32 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findley (New York:
Routledge, 2001), 2: see investigation 6. 
33 J. P. Moreland, “Substance Dualism and the Argument from Self-Awareness,”
Philosophia Christi 13, no. 1 (2011): 28. Moreland represents this as: (CA) 
(s)(x)(y)(Kasx → Kasy) where s ranges over knowing subjects, x ranges over causal
facts, y ranges over the associated causal objects that constitute their causal facts,
and Ka is “has knowledge by acquaintance with.”
34 Moreland, “Substance Dualism and the Argument from Self-Awareness,” 28.
35 Ibid., 27.
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2.5 Knowledge by Acquaintance with Persons
As I have mentioned, we have knowledge by acquaintance with a vari-
ety of things, such as, colors, qualia, the contents of consciousness, and a
whole host of extra-mental things such as doors, trees, and chairs. One way
to differentiate types of KA is to distinguish the various intentional objects.
There is, for example, KA of truths, which according to Richard Fumerton,
“is knowledge made possible by direct acquaintance with truth makers and
(more controversially) the correspondence between truth bearers and truth
makers.”36 This is a very important point, because it implies a non-natural-
istic KA with truth itself, which provides good reason to reject the prevail-
ing naturalistic truncation of knowledge that includes only the hard sci-
ences and makes no room for knowledge of the spiritual life as well as the
postmodern rejection of knowledge. 
What I am most interested in here is KA of persons. This specific type
of KA has very unique features. Eleonore Stump draws out some of these
features by contrasting Frank Jackson’s Mary thought experiment37 with a
modified version of her own. In Jackson’s thought experiment, Mary is a
neuroscientist who is omniscient with respect to facts about the brain and
how it processes color. Mary, imprisoned by a villain, has never had a per-
ceptual experience of color since birth, but after escaping imprisonment
perceives color for the first time. Does she come to know anything new? It
seems clear that she does, but she does so in the acquaintance sense, not in
the propositional sense.
Stump invites us to imagine that in her imprisoned state Mary learns
everything science can teach her about humans from books but has never
interacted or seen a human. Suppose she even knows a great deal about her
mother whom she has never met. Upon being rescued, Mary is united with
her mother who loves her very much. For the first time, Mary will come to
know what it is like to be loved by another. Stump writes,
And this will be new for her, even if in her isolated state she had as
complete a scientific description as possible of what a human being
feels like when she senses that she is loved by someone else . . . Mary
will also come to know what it is like to be touched by someone else, to
be surprised by someone else, to ascertain someone else’s mood, to de-
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36 Richard Fumerton, “Knowledge by Acquaintance vs. Description,” in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/knowledge-acquaindescrip/> (ac-
cessed spring of 2011).
37 This thought experiment was first introduced in Franck Jackson, “Epiphe-
nomenal Qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly 32, no. 137 (April 1982): 127–136; and
more fully developed in, “What Mary Didn’t Know,” Journal of Philosophy 83, no. 5
(May 1986): 291–95. 
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tect affect in the melody of someone else’s voice, to match thought for
thought in conversation, and so on.38
In addition, Mary will come to know her mother—have knowledge of her
mother—not just what it is like to know and experience her mother. She
will have what Stump calls a second-person experience.39
2.6 KA, Truth and Degrees of Knowledge
Truth is a constituent of propositional knowledge. You cannot have PK
of something that is false, because the object of PK is a fact. However, the
object of knowledge by acquaintance is not a fact, but rather the real world
objects to which facts refer. To clarify this, consider the ontology of truth.
The proposition, expressed in the sentence, “The door is closed,” is true if
the real world state of affairs of the door being closed obtains. If the door is
actually closed, the proposition expressed in the sentence, “The door is
closed,” is true. Truth is then a property of propositions. Now, if I have
knowledge by acquaintance of the door being closed, this can only be the
case if the door (the real world object) is actually closed. One can only have
knowledge by acquaintance of real world objects and the actual states of af-
fairs that obtain regarding those real world object. If the door is closed at t1
I cannot have KA of that that door being opened at t1. As such, KA can only
refer to what is real.
Secondly, knowledge is a degreed property, meaning that one does not
need certainty in order to have knowledge. Knowledge does not require
psychological certainty: the complete conviction that one’s belief is true.
Neither does knowledge require epistemic certainty: that one’s belief is
grounded on the best possible evidence or reasons. For example, right now
I have a great deal of evidence that my car is parked in the garage, and if it
is true that my car is in the garage, then I know that my car is in the garage,
even though it is possible that my car is not there. This is a standard feature
of knowledge.40
Knowledge by acquaintance is likewise a degreed property. Although,
it is possible the door is not closed, I can still have KA of the door being
214 Journal of Spiritual Formation & Soul Care
38 Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suf-
fering (London: Oxford University Press, 2010), 52.
39 Ibid., 112.
40 Notice that one can have psychologically certainty even if their belief is false.
Likewise, one can have epistemic certainty without having psychological certainty.
Such a person may not even know that they have epistemic certainty even though
they have it. This can be helpful for people to understand, because they know many
things without knowing that they know or feeling certain. However, when they come
to know that they know, they experience a type of confidence and trust that aids a
life of discipleship that mere emotions cannot sustain.
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open, provided I have direct acquaintance of the door being open and the
door is actually open. Moreover, my direct acquaintance need not be ac-
companied by certainty (psychologically or epistemologically). If I have
KA, I do so regardless of what I think about my certainty with respect to
having KA. I can have some doubt or hesitation about attributing to myself
KA of x, although I do in fact have KA of x. The strength or degree of my
KA can however be assessed, just as cases of perception can. We do not
adopt skepticism about our visual perception, even though we could be and
have in the past been mistaken. The same is true regarding knowledge in
general and KA in particular.
In summary, knowledge by acquaintance is the type of knowledge we
have of other persons and of our self along with other kinds of objects. It is
direct knowledge, not dependent on language or concepts, which is gained
through encounter and often interaction with reality and does not require
certainty. 
3. Knowledge of God and Knowledge by Acquaintance
3.1 Distinct Types of Knowledge in Scripture
With some reflection, it is not too difficult to see how KA relates to
knowledge of God. It fits quite naturally. One can have a great deal of
propositional knowledge about God, while not having ever known God in
the KA sense.41 Paul himself recognizes and makes use of this distinction.42
Philippians 3:9–10 explains that knowing God is not propositional, but be-
ing acquainted with God, as is knowing the power of the resurrection of Je-
sus and what it is like to have fellowship in his sufferings. In Philippians
4:12 Paul says, “I know what it is to have little, and I know what it is to
have plenty.” His knowledge here is of being acquainted with having little
and with having plenty. Similarly, 2 Corinthians 5:21 states, “He made Him
who knew no sin to be sin on our behalf, so that we might become the right-
eousness of God in Him.” Clearly, Jesus has PK regarding the nature of sin,
although he is not acquainted with performing acts of sin. 
According to Matthew 7:22–23 Jesus will say to some, “Depart from
me, I never knew you.” Of course, Jesus knows about these individuals in
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the propositional sense, but he does not know them in the acquaintance
sense as his disciple. These individuals do not have the knowledge of God
that is eternal life (John 17:3). Lastly, Stump persuasively argues that those
such as Job, Samson, Abraham, and Mary of Bethany each enjoyed a pro-
found life-altering KA of God, which could not have been gained through
propositional knowledge about God.43
3.2 Jesus’ Knowledge of God
Consider how Jesus knew God, specifically as revealed in his baptism.
Jesus knew the Father in a unique loving relationship of encounters with
him. Jesus knew he was the beloved Son of the Father, and he related with
him as such. This is instructive for us. We are to know the Father as Jesus
did, in a loving relationship of profound interaction and encounter where
we learn to trust him in the deepest sense possible. Consequently, Jesus used
the trust of little children as our example (Mark 10:13–16; Matt. 19:13–15;
Luke 18:15–17). Children trust in virtue of stable, loving encounters with
their parents. The quality of their trust corresponds to the quality of these
encounters. 
There is a cultural tendency to drive a wedge between knowledge and
relationship. This is almost always held in virtue of its popularity rather
that any real discovery. On the one side, it is insisted, is cold hard knowl-
edge, and on the other is warm loving relationship. According to some, the
Christian life is one of relationship not knowledge. I suggest this is so far
removed from the life and teaching of Jesus that the Apostles would find
such a claim puzzling and perhaps even dangerous. First, as I have argued,
this distinction is artificial with respect to KA as KA of persons involves re-
lationship. 
Secondly, knowledge and love are so intimately tied together that we
can only be loved to the degree that we are known, and we can only love
another to the degree that we know them. This is just as true of knowing
and loving others as it is of knowing and loving our selves. The truth as that
love requires knowledge, and therefore, cannot be estranged from it.
Lastly, in the life and teaching of Jesus we see there is a particular type
of knowledge (KA) which makes relationships possible such that if you
completely reject this way of knowing you are either unable to enter into
the relationship or have a low esteem of such relationships. Jesus embraced
and made available a large variety of knowledge, one of which (KA) is in its
essence relational. The failure to recognize the availability of knowledge of
God is parasitic on the spiritual life (Hosea 4:6). The recent tendency to es-
chew knowledge is to eschew the very life Jesus lived and offers us all in his
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kingdom.44 The phenomenon among Christians to largely live their lives ac-
cording to the ideas and infatuations of cultural icons and celebrities rather
than Jesus is tied to their rejection of Jesus as one who offers knowledge in
all its forms, but especially knowledge of God. 
3.3 KA of God and Interactive Relationship
According to Thomas Reid, “There is no kind of knowledge that tends
so much to elevate the mind as the knowledge of God.”45 This is, at least in
part, because knowledge of God requires an encounter with the most won-
derful person that could ever possibly exist, and encounter changes us. Re-
call that knowledge by acquaintance involves the direct experience or inter-
action of the knower with the object being known. In application, if we are
to know God in the eternal life sense it will be by acquaintance, which re-
quires us to step into a life of interactive relationship with God. We cannot
know him at a distance. However, because one can have KA of someone af-
ter they have the encounter, one need not always be interacting with God in
order to enjoy the knowledge of God that is eternal life. 
The reality of God’s desire for us to encounter him powerfully demon-
strates God’s profound love for us. He simply wants more for us than to
know him from afar where we are left untouched and unchanged. Moser ar-
gues,
As compassionate, God is not satisfied by our merely knowing that
God exists. Such mere propositional knowledge falls short of what God
values by way of redemption: namely, that all people freely choose to
be transformed by God from self-serving to self-giving, loving servants
of the God of morally serious love.46
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That knowing God is accurately understood as knowledge by acquaintance
communicates to us that his love is so profound he will not leave us forever
at a distance. Although, God values that we know he exists, he is not
pleased with us merely knowing that he exists.47 He desires for us to be
caught up in his love, his life, his kingdom, thereby transforming us at the
core of our being. Conversely, rejecting knowledge of God—or even propo-
sitional knowledge about God—results in losing an interactive life with
God (Rom. 1:19–24). True, God will not force himself on us and will at
times withdraw, but only in so far as it aids us in knowing him deeper in a
lifetime punctuated by encounters. 
Lastly, consider what it means to know Jesus as explained in the New
Testament. Paul tells us that the light of the knowledge of the glory of God,
which penetrates darkness, is found in the face of Jesus (2 Cor. 4:6). Re-
garding this passage James Stewart states,
“The light if the knowledge of the glory of God is”—where? In your
dusty books, your neatly tabulated articles, your controversial docu-
ments? No! The light of the knowledge of the glory of God is “on the
face of Jesus Christ,” which means that the only way to know anything
about God is to go and see Jesus for yourself.48
Without the distinction between PK and KA, Stewart’s statement is false.
We can know many things about God apart from seeing Jesus, but only in
the propositional sense. It is true, however, in the acquaintance sense, that
seeing Jesus is necessary for such knowledge of the glory of God. Again,
this is how Jesus knew the Father, not merely in the propositional sense, but
in the acquaintance sense as well.49 This is beautifully displayed in the bap-
tism of Jesus (Matt. 3:13–17; Mark 1:9–11; Luke 3:21–22). Indeed, Jesus’
sense of sonship was at the core of his self-understanding.50
3.4 God, the Given and Direct Awareness
The non-conceptual and non-propositional features of KA make it pos-
sible to have profound experiences of God without possessing any requisite
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complex conception of God. Children, for example, perceive a large variety
of things (trees, the sun, a computer, their parents, their reflection), and
they do so without any concepts of those things. Rather, they see these
things directly. Likewise, we can have direct experiences of God where we
simply receive his presence in whatever way he wishes without preconcep-
tion. Our concepts are no barrier or defeater to his presence, although his
presence may challenge and change our concepts. Consider the two on the
road to Emmaus who did not see Jesus as Jesus, but nonetheless had a pro-
found transforming encounter with Jesus (Luke 24:13–35). 
There is still another interesting feature of KA that may have signifi-
cant implications. Recall that according to Moreland’s causal acquaintance
principle, if person S is directly aware of a hammer’s causing a nail to move
(the causal fact), then S is directly aware of the hammer (the causal ob-
ject).51 In application, if I am aware of the activity of Spirit within me, I am
aware of more than the activity (the causal fact), I am also aware of the
Spirit (the causal agent). Moreover, I am justified in believing that the Spirit
is active within me (speaking to me in prayer, for example) in virtue of the
relevant phenomenological seemings and appearings that are unique to
such experiences, as they are consistent with Scripture.52
A significant element that is relevant for me to know that God is speak-
ing to me is that I become aware of the evidential value of the phenomenol-
ogy associated with my experience of God, as well as his character and pur-
poses as revealed in Scripture and the history of the church. The more
aware I become of the evidential value of these phenomenological seemings
and appearings, the more confidence I will have that God is speaking to me,
or that his presence has come on another as I pray for them. This is part of
the formative project of attunement to the voice and activity of the Spirit in
my conscious mental life and my character. The importance of pneumeto-
logical realism—the reality of the Spirit’s work in the world, my life, and
the life of others—is paramount to such a life. 
3.5 The Phenomenological Character of KA of God
Closely connected with the given is the specific phenomenological char-
acteristics of what is given or presented in KA. Accordingly, when I have
KA of another person, I am acquainted with them in such a way that their
personality is part of the givenness of the experience. I am acquainted with
them in a different way than I am with non-living things. There is some-
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thing more intimate going on where we experience God. H. P. Owen says
this well,
Now, this basic experience of God can be accompanied by its own feel-
ing-tone. The feeling I have in mind is constituted simply and solely by
the reality of the object. In being aware of God we can, not merely in-
tuit God’s existence as the ens realissium . . . but also feel, or sense it.53
In direct acquaintance with God I become aware of his felt tone—the tex-
ture of his manifest presence—which will always have a sense of life, love,
peace, wisdom, and joy. “Firsthand evidence of the divine Spirit’s presence,
then,” Moser explains, “involves a kind of manifested power foreign to
natural expectations. This foreign power is divine self-giving love . . .”54
This direct acquaintance with God and his loving felt tone serves a pro-
foundly potent transformative purpose. Acquaintance with love is a means
of knowing God. Being grounded in love, I comprehend, to the best of my
abilities, the love of Christ (Eph. 3:17–18) and gain a true knowledge of
him (Col. 2:2). This direct acquaintance with the love of God provides a
non-propositional cognitive foundation for knowledge of God, of his activ-
ity, and of his reality.55
Moreover, we are known by God in the very act of knowing and loving
him (1 Cor. 8:3; Gal. 4:9). That is, included in these encounters with God
(as with human persons) we are enabled to have the awareness that we are
also being known. This is not inferred, but directly and intimately per-
ceived. We directly experience being seen and being known by God. That is,
we have KA of God and KA of our encounter with God being aware of us.
Additionally there is what Stump calls dyadic joint attention: the awareness
one has of another person being aware of their awareness of their aware-
ness of them.56 Both individuals are aware of each other’s awareness of each
other being aware of them. Consequently, I am aware of God and simulta-
neously aware of our mutual awareness of each other. Likewise, God is
aware of me, and simultaneously of our mutual awareness of each other. 
To be truly seen is rare for many of us. To be aware of being truly seen
is both rare and profoundly transformative. This has substantial implica-
tions and explains, for one thing, why coming to know God can be pro-
foundly healing and requires trust/faith. In experiencing the presence of
God the disciple of Jesus becomes acquainted with being seen and known
by God. The felt texture of this encounter will be loving, receptive, and af-
firming. We experience being seen in our depths by the One who sees all,
and, moreover, we are not rejected but received, cherished, and poured
into. This is, of course, what we all desperately desire and need. 
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3.6 KA of God and Conceptual Analysis
Recall that concepts habituate attention toward objects and agents of
acquaintance. In seeking out specific objects or agents of acquaintance,
such as God, having accurate concepts of God, self, and the nature of spiri-
tual formation, are quite valuable. Again, Husserl’s insight is helpful: in
acts of knowing, one finds that something is as it has been thought of. Acts
of knowing produce trust and confidence in God and that one is actually
coming to know God. For example, if I have the accurate concept that I can
take my brokenness to God in humility and repentance, then I will be able
to experience the love and acceptance of God. If I had a different concept of
how to approach God in my brokenness, I would not be able to enjoy KA of
God in my brokenness. I might not ever take my brokenness to him. How-
ever, if we understand God as the source of life, that accurate conception
will contribute to encountering him as such. The role of understanding 
evidence as evidence and knowing that one knows cannot be overlooked 
or underestimated. Such realizations are a wellspring of life and cultivate 
spiritual formation as they uniquely produce confidence in God and his
 kingdom.
A very practical implication follows. Although it is popular to talk
about concepts and worldviews as functioning like lenses or glasses we look
at the world though, this analogy is simply not true. If concepts or world-
views function like lenses, they stand between the world and us, and there is
no direct, unmediated knowledge of anything. Consequently, KA of God,
self, and others is simply unattainable. However, if what I have argued is
correct, then concepts and worldviews function much more like a map that
we use to look at the world with, but not through. The glasses analogy is
not only false but also unhelpful, especially regarding spiritual formation.
Notice that nothing needs to change in me in order for me to change how I
see the world on the glasses analogy. I only need to have on the correct
glasses. But this divorces inner transformation from the life of the mind.
What I need is not a new set of glasses, but a new heart, which will enable
me to see, and a map, as it were, to show me what is available in which I
can participate. 
3.7 KA of God and the Human Will
KA commonly does not coercively force itself on anyone. In fact,
knowledge in general is not forced on individuals.57 Likewise, God is non-
coercive in how he makes himself known. He may intrude our life for our
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benefit, but he does not coerce us into knowing him. Rather, we are invited
to surrender our will in order to know and interact with God and become,
what Moser calls, “volitionally attuned to God’s transforming Spirit.”58
This type of reasoning is true of any knowledge discipline. The chemist
does not get to decide how she will come to know the elements. Rather,
based on the specific nature of any element there is an appropriate way one
must yield to it if one is going to gain knowledge of it. One’s volition must
act in concert with the nature of the object or person one wishes to know.
One must resign their presuppositions and receive the object or the individ-
ual as they are, rather than as they want or expect them to be. Conse-
quently, the character of the individual plays a central role in the depth of
knowledge by acquaintance they can have. The formation of one’s will is
crucial to one’s intellectual functioning.59 This is why acquiring knowledge
requires humility of spirit. Here we are brought back to the importance of
spiritual formation for progress in knowledge of God. There are a great
many things we are afraid to know and know about and doing so requires
the work of the Spirit to help us grow in knowledge.60
4. Knowledge by Acquaintance and the Life 
of Discipleship
The implications for what I have presented are far reaching. For exam-
ple, knowledge by acquaintance is much more plausible given a substance
dualist view of human persons. For example, KA is richly phenomenal in
nature and as the hard problem of consciousness shows it seems impossible
for a physical being to have phenomenal states. I take this as further confir-
mation of Willard’s thesis that understanding the immaterial nature of the
human spirit is crucial for failing to do so makes developing a detailed
model of spiritual formation impossible.61 While many other significant im-
plications follow, the project I have in mind here is to work out the conse-
quences of KA regarding the life of the disciple, and I imagine they are just
as far reaching. 
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4.1 The Intelligibility of Faith and Discipleship
First, characterizing encounters of God and the life of faith in terms of
knowledge by acquaintance will make those aspects of the Christian life
more intelligible. Too often this aspect of life in Christ is thought of as com-
pletely non-cognitive, which is both false, as I have argued, and fuels the
common frustration with one’s lack of growth that such beliefs reliably pro-
duce. If we eschew non-cognitive views of faith and adopt a KA approach
three insightful analogies emerge: the relationships in marriage, family, and
close friendship.62 Roberta Bondi writes, 
A knowledge of God cannot be taught or learned apart from living out
a life that is a reflection of who God is . . . Knowledge of God does not
consist of a set of answers to a list of questions. It is more like the way
a wife knows her husband, or a husband knows his wife . . . It is a
knowledge that grows out of living together, responding to each other’s
daily interests and needs, being shaped by deep caring for the other. It
is a transforming knowledge.63
It is easy to understand how one grows in trust for their spouse, parent,
child, or close friend. It is in accord to the degree they interact with them
and come to know them as worthy of trust. Said differently, we come to
have an appropriate faith (trust, confidence) in others to the degree that we
have come to know them by acquaintance as safe. Moreover, the good par-
ent and the good spouse will not be willing to offer only propositional
knowledge about themselves. Those with absent parents know this all too
well. A loving parent, like a loving God, will offer an interactive life with
their children that cultivates trust. The nature of faith in the Christian life
understood in virtue of KA is not so otherworldly, but intelligible, relatable,
and can be seen as attainable.
One practical implication that follows is that the whole church service
(sermon, worship, prayer, sacraments), if they are going to help people
grow in faith—their knowledge of God, must be intentionally crafted in or-
der to make KA available to everyone who is open. It simply is not helpful
to explain, for example, that we ought to pray more or share stories of oth-
ers who took prayer more seriously. What we need to do is help people
come to know who they are in their depths and thereby come to understand
why they do not pray, why they are afraid to depend on love, why they look
to other things than Christ for safety and provision. That is, we need to
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make available to others KA of themselves and of God if we are to help
them flourish as a kingdom people with Jesus as teacher.
4.2 Agents of Acquaintance
There are also profound implications for what we consider the task of
the disciple in evangelism. Evidence, as I have just argued, is of central con-
cern to the Christian life. Evidence can come in the form of argument (Acts
14:15–17, 17:16–32; 1 Cor. 15), which can and does persuade some to faith
(Acts 17:2–4), but also comes in firsthand KA of the Spirit of God. There is
also KA of those who have been transformed by the Spirit and live in the
kingdom of God with graceful transparency. These people can, as Moser
says, “[P]ersonally, saliently, and veridically manifest the reality of God’s
loving character to others, even if somewhat indirectly.”64 One main dimen-
sion of the Gospel of the kingdom of God is that God can deal with our sins
and our character that is habituated toward sin, and he can and will do so
right now. As a result, our character and how people experience us will pro-
vide a type of non-propositional evidence for the truth of Christianity that
is rooted in their KA of us. 
The Christian apologist, for example, should learn to deal in the full
commodity of the kingdom. Argument is vital for many, but alone will not
do, as it is impotent with respect to KA. We must display, when appropriate
and without coercion, the availability of knowing God through logical ar-
guments as well as the love and power of Jesus by the activity of the Spirit
in us. Kindness and compassion for others as we walk beside them in intel-
lectual struggles provides a type of comfort and connection with the Spirit
of Christ that aids in receiving knowledge by soothing a defensive heart. 
Likewise, consider the ministry of healing. The laying on of hands is of-
ten not practiced, but it provides a powerful means of knowledge by ac-
quaintance. Love and compassion are made manifest when we lay hands on
sick and invite the Holy Spirit to come. This simple act helps draw people
into the kingdom. Touch moves people into belonging. It communicates in
a non-propositional way that we love them. In our faithful presence the
manifest presence of God is made available, both to those praying as well as
those receiving. This is all achieved aside from any physical healing taking
place. However, when healing does take place, knowledge of God is power-
fully present and made available. In our actions and through our presence
others can know God in encounter.
Of course, this was the practice of Jesus. In knowing Jesus we know the
Father (John 14:8–10). In a somewhat similar way, in knowing a disciple of
Jesus we can come to know Jesus himself. The goal is first and foremost to
become a loving, faithful, and hopeful presence to those with whom we in-
teract and live. We become available to them so they can come to know us,
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and, in virtue of the causal acquaintance principle discussed in section 2.4,
they become acquainted with the Spirit of Christ acting in and through us. 
Lastly, this KA approach provides a very reasonable and persuasive
context for one to take more seriously Jesus and his way of life by inviting
them to know more through interacting with him. However, Christian
apologetics is often presented so that what is knowable are the arguments
that God exists and that Jesus was raised from the dead by the Father. This
can be for many an important first step to taking KA of God seriously. In
addition, the approach I am suggesting is able to demonstrate that there is
more knowledge to be gained by interacting with Jesus. Willard argues,
To come to know him and to clarify who he really is, people have only
to stand for what he stood for, as best they can, and to do so by inviting
him to take their life into his life and walk with them. If they do just
this with humility and openness—which everyone knows to be his
manner of life—they will know him more and more as they take his life
to be their life.65
There is something about the life of Jesus that when put into practice pro-
vides a wide range of evidence (including direct, non-inferential evidence)
sufficient for one to know that Jesus is Messiah and that there is no other
way than his which leads to eternal life. Abiding in his life helps us come to
know him as well as our true self in the most profound way. 
4.3 Character Formation and KA 
A strong case in virtue epistemology has been made that character is in-
timately conjoined with knowing.66 Who I am in my character includes spe-
cific dispositions that can help or hinder my ability to gain knowledge. Cul-
tivating virtues of being open minded, humble, and careful in my thinking
enhance my ability to gain knowledge. Character formation, when it takes
into account intellectual virtues under the tutelage of Jesus, produces indi-
viduals skilled in gaining knowledge. For example, in Ephesians 1:16–19a
Paul prays for the Ephesians that they would be given KA of the greatness
and goodness of God’s gifts by having the eyes of their hearts (their whole
person) enlightened.67 Who they are in their character enables them to
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know. That their hearts are habituated in faith, hope, and love, conditions
them to know by acquaintance with the greatness and goodness of God and
his gifts. The absence of such character formation precludes one from such
knowledge. 
This is easy to see in KA of persons. As I have pointed out, a unique
feature of KA of persons is that in knowing others I am often being known
and even aware of being known. This form of intimacy is in general a
learned skill that depends greatly on our ability of feel safe in such encoun-
ters. Those who do not feel safe or do not trust others will struggle in re-
signing their will towards knowing others in acquaintance. This is espe-
cially the case in knowledge of God. Because KA is not knowledge at a
distance, the character of the individual will play a decisive role in their
ability to enter into KA of persons, including KA of self. 
Here we see a significant implication for the integration of spiritual
formation into the life of the mind. In cases of KA of persons, the life of the
mind and the life of the heart will be intimately connected. We should ex-
pect that where there is an imbalance of character between the heart and
the mind, that KA of persons will be frustrated. Moreover, the corrective
for learning how to grow in one’s capacity to gain KA of persons will in-
volve their whole person, not just the mind or just the heart. There will be a
particular kind of life that aids in forming individuals as skilled in KA of
persons. Such a life will be cultivated in fellowship with the Spirit and
church. Knowledge as it turns out is intimately conjoined with the heart.
4.4 Emotional Attunement and Scholarly Pride 
Among those committed to scholarship (especially apologetics, theol-
ogy, and philosophy) I often see a distrust of emotions and experiences of
God. There is an allegiance, spoken and unspoken, conscious and subcon-
scious, to the primacy of rationality in conjunction with a low view of rela-
tionality, at least with respect to scholarship. I want to be careful here.
Some describe this as an allegiance to the head and not the heart, as if the
two function in isolation from one another and are not intimately con-
joined. I have already exposed this view as false. Consequently, if we view
scholarship as a ministry that is strictly involved with issues of proposi-
tional knowledge, then we are not completely defending and developing the
knowledge of God that is eternal life. 
I propose that integrating knowledge by acquaintance into the aca-
demic discussion may help correct this problem. There is already a signifi-
cant literature defending the legitimacy of religious experience68 and the
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historical and ongoing miraculous work of the kingdom of God.69 How-
ever, this is often seen as an add-on to the Christian life. If we understand
knowledge of God as KA, then experiences of God can hardly be seen as an
add-on to the Christian life. Rather, life in the kingdom of God naturally in-
cludes various kinds of personal encounters with God. Consequently, the
worlds of spiritual formation, philosophy, and apologetics come much
closer together, and the sanctification gap for scholars is lessened. 
Moreover, recognizing KA and stepping into it with God more fully can
help stave off the kind of hubris too often characteristic of scholars. “Just
as God uses grace to remove pride about good works (Eph. 2:9),” writes
Moser, “he can use revelation to remove pride about self-crediting intellec-
tual means of finding him.”70 Along with this positive change comes a view
of the life of the heart, character, and emotions that will be much higher
and more difficult to ignore providing abundant opportunity to be trans-
formed by the Spirit. Such an approach helps stave off the hubris of philos-
ophy in the flesh (2 Cor. 10:3–5; Col. 2:8).71
4.5 KA and the Legitimacy of Spiritual Disciplines
On the model I am suggesting, spiritual disciplines offer opportunity
for KA of God and self. By the habitual practice of what Frank Laubach
calls “opening windows” we enter into a space where God’s presence can
blow through into our soul.72 Recall, these are not just thin experiences or
non-cognitive practices. Rather, spiritual disciplines provide opportunity
for robust instances of knowledge of the KA kind. Moreover, they do so in
such a way that cannot be accomplished by attending only to propositional
knowledge. 
What is important in recognizing this is that doing so allows one to ap-
preciate the interaction and legitimacy of the various types of knowledge.
When properly practiced, spiritual disciplines do not place an unhealthy
emphasis on either type of knowledge. Nor do they threaten to overturn or
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ignore propositional knowledge as revealed in Scripture. Rather, spiritual
disciplines, as a medium for KA, work in concord with PK, and they inform
one another. Propositional knowledge does not, on its own, provide en-
counters with God. Likewise, knowledge by acquaintance does not, on its
own, serve as the starting point for doctrine. Consequently, we cannot
blame PK for not giving us what is available in KA just as we cannot fault
KA for failing to provide what is available in PK. The two, when ap-
proached properly, do not compete for the domain over the other. My hope
is that understanding this may help champion spiritual formation among
those who are skeptical or critical as well as challenge those of us in the
spiritual formation community to grow more analytic in our scholarship. 
Conclusion
In summary, knowledge of God cannot be reduced to a non-cognitive,
merely private, thin experience, but is genuine knowledge of God by ac-
quaintance. Moreover, this account sheds light on a variety of issues of spe-
cial significance for the rational justification of understanding spiritual
growth on a relational holistic (heart and mind) model. Likewise, I have of-
fered justification for the reality of hearing God’s voice, and knowing his
activity, which has important phenomenological characteristics. Lastly, I
have applied knowledge by acquaintance to a handful of issues germane to
spiritual formation. In these ways, among many others, eternal life is in-
deed knowledge of God, for by knowing God in the acquaintance sense we
are drawn into his life and his life is drawn into ours. It is in the encounter
of knowing the Triune God by acquaintance that we, by the Spirit, abide in
Christ where true life is hidden. 
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